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BACK ON THE ROAD AGAIN-THE
MOBILITY EXCEPTION IN THE 70's
The true test of law is not in its creation, but in its enforcement.
The midwife has influence only once; the impact of one's keeper is
felt many times. The Supreme Court gave birth to the Coolidge1 doc-
trine with respect to the mobility exception 2 (an exception to the
fourth amendment's8 proscription against warrantless searches), but
the development and application of the law fell to its keeper, the lower
courts.
This Comment will attempt to identify the pattern of the application
and development of the mobility exception in the lower courts since
Coolidge and will reflect upon the potential impact of the more recent
decision of Cady v. Dombrowski.4 Prior to this examination, the judi-
cial development of the mobility exception by the United States
Supreme Court is reviewed.
I. Tm SPIRITUAL HERiTAGE: AUTOMOBILES
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The framers of the Constitution abhorred the prospect of continuing
the tradition of the colonial period's indiscriminate "general warrant"
search of persons and places.5 The inclusion of the fourth amendment
in the Bill of Rights consequently establishes the search warrant as
a condition precedent to a "reasonable" search in the vast majority
of cases:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and -no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and ithe persons or things to be seized.6
In 1925, the United States Supreme Court, in Carroll v. United
States,7 promulgated an exception to the fourth amendment's search
1. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
2. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See notes 7-12 infra and ac
companying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
5. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
7. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
MOBILITY EXCEPTION
warrant requirement by allowing a warrantless search of an automobile
when exigent circumstances existed. The Court defined exigent cir-
cumstances as those in which the mobility of the automobile renders
it impracticable to secure a search warrant.8 In Carroll, the defend-
ant's automobile was stopped and searched as it was seen moving
through the state by police who had probable cause to believe that it con-
tained contraband liquor.9 On the basis of evidence procured in the
search, the defendants were convicted of violating the Prohibition
Act.10 The Supreme Court felt that, since the automobile was mobile
and since the occupants had been alerted when the police stopped their
car, an exigency was created which made the procuring of a warrant
impracticable. 1 The focus of this "moving vehicle" exception was on
the possible removal or destruction of evidence. Had the officers taken
time to secure a warrant, the contraband liquor could have been re-
moved from the vehicle or driven out of the jurisdiction.'"
Crucial to the applicability of this exigent circumstances exception
is the element of "mobility." It is significant that mobility has been
given a special definition in the Carroll context. More than the mere
capacity to be moved, as would be the ordinary connotation, it also ne-
cessitates the concurrence of other circumstances or events which ren-
der the opportunity for search a "fleeting"'" one, such as the existence
of "someone at large who has the power and ability to move [the car]
before an officer can obtain a warrant."' 4 Thus, it becomes clear that
the foundation of the Carroll exception is the practicability of obtain-
ing a warrant, which is itself dependent on the presence or absence
of the element of "mobility."
In United States v. Preston,'5 the Court invalidated a warrantless
search of an automobile at a police station because it was too remote
in time to have been incidental to arrest 6 and because it was not within
the Carroll exception since the vehicle was properly in police custody
and not likely to be moved out of the jurisdiction.' 7 The Preston de-
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id. at 143-45. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed
1935),
11. 267 U.S. at 153, 161-62.
12. Id. at 153.
13. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
14. Murray & Aitkin, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 Loy.
L.A.L.'REv. 95, 101 (1970).
15. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
16. Id. at 367.
17. Id. at 368.
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fendants were taken to the police station on a vagrancy charge,' along
with the car in which they had been sitting.19 After booking the de-
fendants,20 the car was searched for the first time,21 and evidence was
discovered which formed the basis for their conviction of another
crime.22 In invalidating the search, the Court said:
The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his com-
panions had been arrested and taken in custody to the police station
and the car had been towed to the garage. At this point there was
no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons
in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime .... 23
Later decisions, however, so expanded the Carroll principle as to lose
sight of its original justification--exigency resulting from mobility. In
Cooper v. California,4 decided three years after Preston, the Supreme
Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile at a police sta-
tion one week after the defendant's arrest for selling narcotics.2 5
Cooper's car had been impounded under a state statute relating to nar-
cotics violations. 26  While the car was in police custody pending for-
feiture proceedings, 27 the warrantless search was conducted, and nar-
cotics were found.28 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
search29 despite the obvious ease with -which a search warrant could
have been obtained. The Court reasoned that, since the police had
legal custody and since forfeiture proceedings would not commence for
four months, it would be unreasonable to deny police the right to
search.30  The Court stated: "It is no answer to say that the police
18. Id. at 365.
19. The arresting officers took his car to the station simply because they did not wish
to leave it on the street. It was not suggested that they did this other than for Preston's
convenience or that they had any right to impound the car and keep it from Preston or
from whomever he sent for it. The fact that the police had custody of Preston's car
was totally unrelated to the vagrancy charge for which they arrested him, as was their
subsequent search of the car. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
20. 376 U.S. at 365.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 365-66.
23. Id. at 368.
24. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
25. Id.
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11610 (West 1970). This section pro-
vides that any officer making an arrest for a narcotics violation shall seize any vehicle
used to store, conceal, transport, sell, or facilitate the possession of narcotics and de-
liver it to the State Division of Narcotic Enforcement to be held as evidence until a for-
feiture has been declared or a release ordered.
27. 386 U.S. at 60.
28. Id. at 60.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Id. at 60. The court added:
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could have obtained a warrant, for '[t]he relevant test is not whether it
is reasonable to procure a warrant but whether the search was reason-
able.' "31 It is true that the ultimate test of a search is its reasonable-
ness.3 2  Nevertheless, the Cooper Court ignored the principle that the
impracticability of procuring a warrant is a necessary prerequisite to the
determination that a warrantless search is "reasonable."
33
The Cooper Court distinguished Preston on two grounds: first, the
Preston search was not related to the alleged offense of vagrancy (i.e.,
there are no instrumentalities or contraband involved in vagrancy),
whereas the search of Cooper's car was related to the narcotics
charge;34 and, second, no state auto seizure statute existed in Preston.35
Such factual distinctions are somewhat unconvincing. As Justice Doug-
las noted in his Cooper dissent, the reasoning and facts of Preston
seemed to be on "all fours" with Cooper.36 This would seem true
even given the fact that the search in Cooper was related to the
charged offense, while the search in Preston was not. Neither Cooper
nor Preston involved a warrantless search incident to an arrest, and
fears concerning destruction of evidence by the accused are justified
only at that point in time. Furthermore, such fears are rarely justified
in the auto situation even at the time of arrest, since the accused is
in custody outside the auto and, therefore, does not have access to evi-
dence inside -the auto. For the same reason, searches of autos for
weapons at the time of arrest are unjustifiable. As the Carroll Court
made clear in originally creating the auto search exception, the sole
justification is the mobility of the vehicle. In Carroll, the mobility
justified a search for evidence related to the suspected offense based
on probable cause existing prior to the arrest. In both Preston and
Cooper, the searches occurred after the arrest and could only be
justified if there were danger of evidence relating to the charged offenses
This case is not Preston nor controlled by it. Here the officers seized petitioner's
car because they were required to do so by state law. They seized it because of
the crime for which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it and
they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded . . . . The for-
feiture of petitioner's car did not take place until four months after it was law-
fully seized. It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain
the car in their garage for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it.
Id. at 61-62.
31. Id. at 62, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
32. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
33. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which affirmed the contin-
ued vitality of the practicability principle delineated in Carroll. Id. at 764 n.9.
34. 386 U.S. at 61.
35. Id. at 59-61.
36. Id. at 65.
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being destroyed by persons other than the accused. Such a danger exists
only if the car cannot be retained in the custody of the police. In
Preston, this mobility factor was arguably present since, as the Cooper
Court recognized, the arresting officers took Preston's car to the sta-
tion simply because they did not wish to leave it on the street. It
was not suggested that they did -this other than for Preston's conven-
ience or that they had any right to impound the car and keep it from
Preston or from whomever he sent for it. Even assuming that this theo-
retical mobility would justify a warrantless search, however, the
Preston search was impermissible since it was totally unrelated to the
charged offense-vagrancy. This second question of relatedness is ir-
relevant in Cooper since there was clearly no danger of insufficient
police control of Cooper's vehicle. It had been impounded under a
state statute because of its use in the narcotics offense charged. Thus,
the second distinction between Cooper and Preston-the existence of
the state auto seizure statute in Cooper-makes the warrantless search
in Cooper even less justifiable than in Preston and renders the first
distinction-the relatedness of the offense to the search-irrelevant.
In both cases the possibility that evidence would be destroyed or taken
from the jurisidiction was slight.3 7  In addition, the time and space
relations between seizure and search were very similar, there was
sufficient time in each instance to secure a warrant, and, apparently,
there was probable cause to search the automobiles in each case. 8
On the face of it, then, Cooper appears to be inconsistent with Pres-
ton in holding that, where an automobile is validly within the custody
of the police at the station and where probable cause for search exists,
the search may be conducted without a warrant despite the lack of any
existing urgency. The Preston/Cooper split was resolved in the view
of some legal commentators" by Chimel v. California4 9 and its re-
jection of the "reasonableness test" as a means for justifying searches
incident to arrest.41 The initiation of warrantless searches, accord-
37. See 52 MINN. L. REV. 533, 538 (1967).
38. See Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 1969); Annot., 26 L.
Ed. 2d 893, 907 n.7 (1971).
39. Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
40. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41. In determining the validity of a warrantless search incident to arrest, the Supreme
Court has held that the ultimate criterion is the "reasonableness" of the search. Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). The Court has stated that incident
to arrest, the seizure of items within the control of the arrestee is reasonable. Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925). The Court, however, has held that general
exploratory searches and that warrantless seizures of evidence away from the place of
[Vol. 7
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ing to Chimel, can be justified only by the necessities of the situation,
and their scope must be similarly limited.42 Searches were thus
limited to an area from which the arrestee could obtain weapons or
destroy evidence.43 The Court also echoed the sentiment of Katz v.
United States44 regarding the sanctity of the warrant requirement
under the fourth amendment:
[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions. 45
The Chimel Court's perception of the relative maturity of search
and seizure decisional law was quickly dispelled, however, in Cham-
bers v. Maroney.46 In Chambers, a Gulf service station was robbed,47
and one of the attendants was instructed to place the money in a right-
hand glove.48 Two teenage witnesses reported the incident to the
police 49 who issued a bulletin with automobile and occupant descrip-
tions. 50 The occupants were arrested,51 and the car was driven to the
station where it was searched. 52  The first search revealed nothing; 3
but after interrogating the suspects, the police conducted a second and
more thorough search of the car which revealed revolvers, a right-hand
glove filled with change, and credit cards bearing the name of another
service station attendant who had been robbed earlier in the same
area.54 The Court held that the arresting officers had probable cause
the arrest are unreasonable and proscribed by the fourth amendment. United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). The reasonableness of a warrantless search incident to
arrest depends upon the exigencies of the circumstances at the time of arrest. Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925). The test is whether it is reasonable for
the police to secure a search warrant beforehand. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 708 (1948). A more flexible criterion of reasonableness was declared by the
Court in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950), where it was pointed
out that the relevant test was not whether the police had time to secure a search war-
rant, but whether the search was reasonable.
42. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
43. Id.
44. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
46. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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to make the arrest,55 but that the delayed search could not be justified
as incident to the arrest. 6  The Chambers Court then turned to an
examination of potential exigencies arising out of -the factual situation
in order to determine if the warrantless search was satisfactory. As in
Preston and Cooper, there is language in Chambers which suggests
that the applicability of the Carroll exception necessitated something
more than the mere fact that an automobile was involved. 7  Never-
theless, the Chambers Court felt that both the probable cause and the
mobility factor continued at the station and was thus willing to permit
a warrantless search either on the highway or at the station.r8 The
highway search falls neatly into the Carroll "automobile exception"
because of the substantial risk of losing the car to another jurisdiction.
The same justification is apparently absent, however, when the auto-
mobile is in custody at the station, unless there is some presumption
to be drawn from the inherent self-propelled mobility of an auto-
mobile.
The Chambers Court had touched all the right Carroll bases but still
found a circuitous path home. Strictly applied, Carroll would have
conditioned the search upon a validly obtained warrant, since potential
mobility alone was insufficient when the potential did not give birth
to an exigency. An impounded vehicle is hardly a '"leeting target,"
"In]or . . . was there any danger that the car would be moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction."5 9
Justice Stewart in Chimel had noted that the scope of a warrant-
less search was to be circumscribed by the demands of the situation and
was not to be freely expanded and that no search was to be conducted
without a warrant despite the unquestionable existence of probable
cause. 60 Contrary to the spirit of Chimel, Chambers went beyond the
necessities of the situation in allowing a warrantless search when the
police had the authority to temporarily immobilize the auto while a
warrant was sought. The Court recognized the two alternatives avail-
55. Id. at 46.
56. Id. at 37, citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
57. Carroll . .. holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable
cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the
occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained.
399 U.S. at 51.
58. Id. at 51-52. The Cooper court justified the search on grounds of police safety
and reasonableness since they had to keep the auto at least four months anyway, while
the Chambers court was concerned with an ad hoc balancing of fourth amendment val-
ues.
59. United States v. Preston, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
60. 395 U.S. at 763, 765.
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able to the police in such Carroll-like situations:
[E]ither the search must be made immediately without a warrant or
the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever
period is -necessary to obtain a warrant for -the search. 1
Prior to Chimel, decisions had adopted the view that a warrantless
seizure, as opposed to a warrantless search, represented the lesser
of the two intrusions.8 2  In Vale v. Louisiana,63 the defendant was
arrested outside his home on a narcotics charge." At that time there
was probable cause to believe that the house contained narcotics;65
however, the inside of the house was too remote from the point of
apprehension for a search to be incident to the arrest. 6  The Court
did not address itself to the validity of a limited intrusion of a cursory
nature to determine if anyone was in the house who might destroy
incriminating evidence; 67 it simply invalidated the extensive warrant-
less search of the house.6 In United States v. Van Leeuwan,69 the
Court upheld the validity of the lesser intrusion; namely, a warrantless
one day seizure of a suspicious package in the mails while a search
warrant was obtained.7 0  Terry v. Ohio71 offers yet another example
of the Court's disposition in favor of limited response by its enuncia-
tion of the limited frisk rule to defuse potential danger to police where
a warrantiess search is not permissible. Taken together, these deci-
sions point to a strong judicial preference for restrained police re-
sponse in cases which present fourth amendment questions. Thus,
when an urgent situation may be answered by temporary seizure,
police conduct should be confined until a warrant can be obtained.72
61. 399 U.S. at 51.
62. Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
63. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 32, 34.
66. Id. at 34.
67. See generally id. at 35.
68. Id. at 34.
69. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
70. Id. at 249.
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that an officer may make a limited "frisk" of a
suspect if he fears for his personal safety, but may not undertake a full warrantless
search. Id. at 20, 30.
72. The debate was apparent even in Chambers. Justice White, speaking for the
Court, noted that:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the im-
mobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained;
arguably, only the "lesser" instrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes
the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which is the "lesser" intrusion is
itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circum-
1974] 557
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Viewed by some as a significant retreat from Chimel,78 Chambers
produced predictions of lower court confusion 7" and of the complete de-
letion of auto searches from the ordinary requirement of judicially
sanctioned search warrants.75 The inherent mobility of a car appeared
sufficient to justify a warrantless search when probable cause existed
to believe that a search would produce contraband or evidence of a
crime.
In a case presenting perhaps the most detailed treatment of the sub-
ject, Coolidge v. New Hampshire," some of the fears inspired by
Chambers were eased, for -the Court, in a sharply divided opinion,
77
seemingly returned to its original concept of mobility and the attendant
requirement that conditions be such as to create a danger that the
automobile would be removed or evidence destroyed before the police
could obtain a warrant.
Defendant Coolidge had been a suspect in the murder of a fourteen
year old girl for some time.78 A week after her body was found, he
was interrogated and then released after one night in jail,70 only to
be arrested at his home three weeks later.80 His car was towed to
stances.
399 U.S. at 51-52. Justice Harlan, concurring in part, countered: "I believe it clear
that a warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values."
id. at 64.
73. See note 109 infra.
74. See State v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971);
Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448 (Wyo. 1971).
75. See Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L. Rnv. 1011,
1027 (1971); 46 NoTR DA m LAw. 610, 615 (1971).
76. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
77. The plurality opinion by Justice Stewart was joined in by Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan and Marshall. Id. at 445. Justice Harlan concurred in the result and joined the
plurality in Parts I, 11-D and 1I of their opinion. He refused to concur in Parts H-
A, fl-B and 11-C, which refuted state theories that the search was incident to arrest (id.
at 455); that it was predicated on the automobile exception, without a showing of exi-
gent circumstances (id. at 458); or that it was valid on a "plain view" theory of search-
ing the car as an "instrumentality of the crime." Id. at 464. Chief Justice Burger joined
the dissent of Justice White (who sought to defend his opinion for the Court in Cham-
bers), and Parts H1 and III of Justice Black's dissent. Justice Blackmun also agreed with
most of Part 11 and I of Justice Black's dissent, and he agreed with most of Part I
of Justice Black's opinion, which argued that the fourth amendment supports no ex-
clusionary rule.
78. Id. at 445-47.
79. Id. at 446.
80. The police had secured a search warrant, but it was held invalid. "mhe State
Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to
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the police station two and one-half hours after the arrest but was not
searched until two days later.81 At the time of the search there was
probable cause to believe that a search might produce evidence since
witnesses had connected the car with the crime."' Of course, the
"mobility" of the car, to the same extent as in Chambers, continued
while in police custody. The plurality opinion repudiated the search,
however, since "the opportunity for search was . . . hardly 'fleet-
ing,' "3 and a majority of the Court endorsed this statement:
Since the police knew of the presence of the automobile and planned
all along to seize it, there was no exigent circumstance to justify their
failure to obtain a warrant.8 4
The Court thus refused the state's attempt to link Coolidge to the
Carroll/Chambers chain. Quoting the Carroll rationale, the plurality
added emphasizing italics to the phrase limiting the warrant exception
in vehicle searches to instances "[w]here it is not practicable to secure
a warrant.1
8 5
In this case, the practicability of securing a warrant seemed evident
to the plurality, who noted that the police in the Coolidge investigation
had known for some time prior to the search of the role of the vehicle
in the crime. 6 Coolidge himself was aware that he was a suspect;"7
he had ample opportunity to destroy any incriminating evidence; 8
there was no indication that he ever contemplated flight; 9 and he co-
operated fully with law enforcement authorities. 90 The arrest of the
petitioner was secured; Coolidge could not have reached the car after
arrest, and his wife was denied access to the car after it was seized. 91
The plurality then emphasized that the exigent circumstances may
arise when there is "an automobile stopped on the highway."92  It
the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial ... signed and issued
[the warrants himself] acting as a justice of the peace." Id. at 447. The court agreed
with the defendant's claim that the warrant authorizing the seizure and subsequent
search of his automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and de-
tached magistrate." Id. at 449.
81. Id. at 447-48.
82. Id. at 446-47, 450.
83. Id. at 460.
84. Id. at 478.






91. Id. at 461.
92. Id. at 473. See text accompanying notes 102-119 supra.
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observed, however, that there was no conceivable way Coolidge could
have reached the car in the driveway after the arrival of the police."
The car was effectively under police control continually from the moment
they appeared, 94 and not just when it was actually seized. Consequently,
the plurality concluded:
Surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the rule of Carroll v.
United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportun-
ity on an open highway after a hazardous chase . . . . In short, by no
possible stretch of the imagination can this be made into a case where
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant," . . . and the "automobile
exception," despite its label, is simply irrelevant.95
Absent exigent circumstances, the plurality felt that there could be
no delayed search under Chambers even though the police had prob-
able cause:96
93. 403 U.S. at 460.
94. See id. at 461-62.
95. Id. at 462.
96. Probable cause is enough evidence to induce a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that there is contraband, weapons, or evidence of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), as cited in United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Johnson, 340 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In the words of Car-
roll, probable cause is defined as reasonable cause to believe that the contents of the
automobile "offend against the law." 267 U.S. at 159.
Though there has been a diversity of opinion on the question of whether a stop for a
traffic violation is justification for a general search of the vehicle (see Annot., 10 A.L.R.
3d 314 (1966)), the reported cases in the lower courts since Coolidge uniformly hold
that a general search is not justified by a stop predicated on a traffic violation. Cow-
din v. People, 491 P.2d 569 (Colo. 1971), excluded evidence secured in an auto search
conducted after the driver was stopped for speeding. The court noted that:
[A]fter the police observed and obtained identifying information from the li-
cense plates, the make and serial number of the car, and the driver's license and
automobile registration certificate, the constitutional limits of this search were
exhausted.
Id. at 571. Accord, United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1972) (a noisy
muffler); Sayne v. State, 279 N.W.2d 196 (Ind. 1972) (stop based on malfunctioning
headlight); Ison v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (failure to
dim headlights); State v. Koen, 487 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1972) (general traffic offense);
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 275 A.2d 51 (Pa. 1971) (driving without lighted rear lights).
A general search predicated on the absence of a registration certificate is unlawful
(Watts v. United States, 297 A.2d 790 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); United States v. Day, 331
F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1971)), as is a general search prompted by the failure of the
driver to produce his driver's license. People v. James, 194 N.W.2d 57 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971).
Probable cause to search an auto has frequently been supplied by a source other than
the searching officer. See United States v. Sprouse, 472 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir. 1973) (an
outstanding arrest warrant on a charge of interstate transportation of stolen property
justified a general search of the vehicle without a search warrant); State v. Poole, 500
P.2d 726 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972) (an informant's tip on a burglary suspect ripened into
1974] MOBILITY EXCEPTION
The rationale of Chambers is that given a justified initial intrusion,
there is little difference between a search on the open highway and a
later search at the station. Here, we deal with the prior question of
whether the initial intrusion is jus.fied.97
This would seem to represent the essence of the Coolidge decision
with respect to auto searches. Since Coolidge does not purport to over-
rule Chambers, the two decisions can only be reconciled by the
mechanical proposition that the existence of unforeseeable exigent cir-
cumstances at the point of initial intrusion justifies later intrusions
even though the exigencies have subsequently dissolved.
A -variety of circumstances can qualify as exigent circumstances.s
The location of a vehicle and its condition,99 the proximity of the de-
fendant and/or his confederates to the vehicle searched,100 and the
practicability of law enforcement officials securing a warrant 0 1 are all
factors which, when balanced against the need for an immediate
search, can confer upon an officer the right to conduct a warrantless
search of -the vehicle. With so many imponderables, it is no wonder
'that the decisions and supporting rationales of the lower courts are
not entirely consistent; however, as this survey indicates, a general pat-
tern of enforcement has emerged, and though it is stained by some
exceptional decisions, the pattern is a generally reliable guide to the
permissible scope of warrantless vehicle searches.
probable cause when the description and make of car, the number of occupants, and the
direction of travel corresponded to the vehicle observed by patrolling officers six min-
utes after they received the tip via broadcast); accord, United States v. Leon, 460 F.2d
299 (9th Cir. 1972) (a computer report identifying a specific automobile at a specific
motel commonly used in Yuma for smuggling is probable cause when reinforced by su-
spicious comings and goings); White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Rothenberg, 345 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Coyne v. State, 485
S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
With respect to a search of a vehicle at a border, the test is not probable cause, but
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Maggard, 451 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Tsoi Kwan Sang, 416 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1969).
When a driver is lawfully arrested in a vehicle, the officer has a right to search the
vehicle as an incident to the lawful arrest. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145
(1972); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1963).
97. 403 U.S. at 463 n.20.
98. The term exigent circumstances has been defined as
the existence of conditions which imperatively demand that the search proceed
lest the delay necessary to obtain the magistrate's intervention present an immedi-
ate danger to the officer or permit the evanescent evidence of crime to be con-
cealed or destroyed.
United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 27 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. See notes 102-26 infIra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 213-34 infra and accompanying text.
101. 403 U.S. at 478.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
I. CLEAR CASES OF MOBILITY
A. The Highway Stop
The first section of the pattern is the clear situation of a mobile
vehicle: the highway stop. Both state and federal courts have held
that a mechanically operative vehicle stopped and searched 0 2 on the
street or highway is mobile. 10 3 The rationale is that, even though the
vehicle is stopped, it has the mechanical capability of movement and
it is in a location that provides a ready access for flight. 10 4 An auto-
mobile stopped on the highway may be driven off before law enforce-
ment officials can secure a search warrant.10  His "opportunity to
102. A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and
that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way.
Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 513 (Ala. 1973). With respect to an automobile, a
routine check of the vehicle with the aid of a flashlight does not constitute a search.
Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W. 2d 537, 539 (Tenn. 1972). A check of the serial number
of a vehicle by opening a door or lifting a hood has been held not to be a search when
the officer has a legitimate reason to identify the car. Pasterchik v. United States, 400
F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); Cotton v. United
States, 371 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967). All jurisdictions have required both prob-
able cause and exigent circumstances to exist in order for the warrantless search to be
valid under the mobility exception. E.g., United States v. Pollard, 466 F.2d 1, 4 (10th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Colbert, 454 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Gerry,
489 P.2d 288, 291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Eastin, 289 N.E.2d 673, 678-79
(Ill. Ct. App. 1972); State v. McReynolds, 195 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Iowa 1972); State v.
Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 691 (Me. 1972); King v. State, 298 A.2d 446, 449 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1973); State v. Ratliff, 189 S.E.2d 179, 183 (N.C. 1972); State v. Richards,
489 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1971); State v. Morsette, 502 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972).
103. E.g., United States v. Chapman, 474 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Cohn, 472 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1973); Orricer v. Erickson, 471 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Weatherford, 471 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Christophe, 470 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Henderson, 469 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1972); Raffone v. Adams, 468 F.2d 860 (2d
Cir. 1972); Stone v. Patterson, 468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972); Dell v. Louisiana, 468
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Day, 331 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1971); State v. Lawson, 491 P.2d 457
(Ariz. 1971); State v. Hines, 504 P.2d 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Gerry, 489
P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct App. 1971); People v. Evans, 34 Cal. App. 3d 175, 109 Cal. Rptr.
117 (1973); Isaac v. State, 274 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. 1971); Corrao v. State, 290 N.E.2d
484 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Ashcraft v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. Ct. App.
1972); People v. Burkhart, 195 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Coy, 200
N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1972); State v. Gurule, 500 P.2d 427 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Shaffer, 288 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1972); Coyne v. State, 485 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); State v. Lehman, 506 P.2d 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); cf. State
v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683 (Me. 1972).
104. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
105. Id.
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search is fleeting.' 1 0 6  And the detention of the automobile by the
officer is considered to be both impracticable and a sure source of dis-
comfort to the detained driver and passengers. It is considered equally
impracticable to require that the officer post a guard over the auto
while a warrant is secured. 10 7 Thus, a vehicle stopped on the highway
is mobile, and a warrant is not required prior to search.
The prevailing rationale for the mobility exception applied to ve-
hicles stopped on the highway is thus clear. The exigent circum-
stances are: (1) the existence of the capability for movement; (2)
the location of the vehicle, which confers ready access for flight; and
(3) the perceived impracticability of securing a warrant. 08  The
crucial factor which expands the use of the mobility exception with
respect to a highway stop and, in effect, gives law enforcement officials
a virtual blank check to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle
stopped on a highway, is not the requirement of exigent circumstances,
which is easily satisfied, but the early point at which exigent circum-
stances are measured. This is the key to an understanding of the war-
rantless highway search. If exigent circumstances are measured at the
time of search, the mobility exception is quite limited, but since exi-
gent circumstances are evaluated at the time of the initial intrusion0 9
(the stop of the vehicle), exigent circumstances are almost always
found to exist, and thus a warrantless search of a vehicle on the high-
way is valid. The significance of when exigent circumstances are
measured becomes clear upon analyzing State v. Lehman,"10 a typical
highway stop and search case.
In Lehman, the defendant and his wife were driving on a street
when law enforcement agents stopped the car and, with probable
cause, placed the defendant under arrest."' Here, at the time of stop,
the court found "exigent circumstances" to exist and upheld the
106. Id.
107. United States v. Curwood, 338 F. Supp. 1104, 1115 (D. Mass. 1972); State ex
rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 498 P.2d 444, 450 (Ariz. 1972).
108. See generally cases cited in note 103 supra.
109. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S at 463 n.20. -Accord, United States v.
Cameglia, 468 F.2d 1084, 1089-90 (2d Cir. 1972); Suggs v. State, 269 So. 2d 136, 139
(Ala. Crim. App. Ct. 1972); State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 498 P.2d 444, 450 (Ariz.
1972); Hunter v. State, 194 S.E.2d 680, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Canaday,
275 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Ill. 1971); People v. Babic, 287 N.E.2d 24, 29 (111. Ct. App.
1972); Williams v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Note
Auto Search: The Rocky Road From Carroll to Coolidge, 17 S.D.L. Rnv. 98, 112-13
(1973).
110. 506 P.2d 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
111. Id. at 1318.
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search." 2 The exigent circumstance was the fact that an operable ve-
hicle was stopped on the highway and occupied by one (the defendant
or his wife) capable of moving the vehicle." 8  Since an exigent cir-
cumstance clearly existed under prevailing interpretations, a warrant-
less search was valid. But what if the court were to evaluate the circum-
stances at the time of the actual search rather than at the time of the
stop? If this were the law, then the Lehman vehicle would not be
mobile. When it was searched, both the defendant (who was hand-
cuffed) and his wife were removed from the vehicle.1 4  At the time of
search, neither the defendant nor his wife could move the vehicle; it
was stationary and not going anywhere. If exigent circumstances are
measured here, at the point of search, mobility does not exist. Since it
is a frequent practice of law enforcement officers to search a car after
an arrest has been made and after the defendant has been removed from
his vehicle," 5 the measurement of exigent circumstances at the initial in-
trusion point removes the highway search from the warrant requirement.
Whether the delay between the initial intrusion and subsequent search
is one minute or one day," 8 the result is the same, since the existence of
exigent circumstances at the point of initial intrusion is the controlling
consideration."17  Thus, the delayed search of a vehicle that is in police
custody or locked in some storage facility is considered proper"18 if ex-
112. Id. at 1320. The court is presumably referring to "mobility" when it speaks
of exigent circumstances.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1318.
115. See United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1972); Stone v. Patterson,
468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Coy, 200 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1972); State v.
Gurule, 500 P.2d 427 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
116. Gomez v. Beto, 471 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1972) (search 15-30 minutes after ar-
rest); People v. Canaday, 275 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. 1971) (search one hour after arrest);
People v. Babic, 287 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972) (search ten minutes after arrest);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (search the morning
following the arrest).
117. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971). In analyzing Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), Justice Stewart made the following comment:
It is true that the actual search of the automobile in Chambers was made at the
police station many hours after the car had been stopped on the highway, when
the car was no longer movable, and "exigent circumstances" had passed, and, for
all the record shows, there was a magistrate easily available. Nonetheless, the
analogy to this case is misleading. The rationale of Chambers is that given a
justified initial intrusion, there is little difference between a search on the open
highway and a later search at the station. Here, we deal with the prior question
of whether the initial intrusion is justified.
Id. at 463 n.20.
118. United States v. Chapman, 474 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cas-
taldi, 453 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971); Hunter v. State, 194 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App.
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igent circumstances existed at the time of the initial intrusion.119
B. Other Locations Conferring Mobility
In addition to -the public street or highway, certain other locations
are thought to confer mobility upon a vehicle. A vehicle parked in
a public parking place120 or near a place of residence of an arrestee' 2 '
is considered mobile by virtue of its location. The logic of the law
is the same as in the highway stop situation. The location and con-
dition of the machine is such that it has the capability to move, and it
enjoys ready access to routes of escape: "the opportunity to search is
fleeting" and the exigent circumstance requirement is satisfied. The key
to this category of clear mobility is the dual requirement of capability
of movement and ready access to roads of escape. When these are
present, the courts will find mobility. If novel situations can fit into
this pigeonhole,122 courts will find exigent circumstances to exist and
1972); King v. State, 298 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); Issac v. State, 274
N.E.2d 231 (Ind. 1971); State v. Morsette, 502 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
119. The requirement of exigent circumstances at the point of the initial intrusion has
not been followed by many lower courts. Judge Brett of the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals has held that an automobile followed by a policeman for six blocks and
stopped on a highway was immobilized when the defendant was placed in the police car
prior to the search. Norton v. State, 501 P.2d 877 (Okla. Crim. App. Ct. 1972). He
reached a similar conclusion earlier in the case of Henry v. State, 494 P.2d 661,
669 (Okla. Crim. App. CL 1972). In both cases probable cause was also lacking for
the search (494 P.2d at 665, 501 P.2d at 879), and the judge may have been engaging
in an exercise of police wrist-slapping.
In People v. Emert, 274 N.W.2d 364 (II. Ct. App. 1971), an officer initially searched
a vehicle for fruits of a robbery and for weapons. He found the weapons and a
portion of the stolen money in a search of the vehicle conducted off the highway. The
court ruled unconstitutional a second warrantless search conducted at a storage garage
because it was practicable for law enforcement personnel to secure a warrant. Id. at
368. No mention was made of the existence of exigent circumstances at the point of
initial intrusion. The court may have been influenced by the fact that a warrant for the
second search had been issued, but not served. Id. See also State v. Allen, 190 S.E.2d
714 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (evidence secured in a delayed auto search was excluded on
grounds of a lack of both probable cause and exigent circumstances and where a correct
reading of the initial intrusion test would have resulted in a finding of mobility).
120. State v. Ratliff, 189 S.W.2d 179, 180 (N.C. 1972) (car in parking lot of a furni-
ture store); State v. Poole, 500 P.2d 726, 728 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972) (car stopped in a
metered parking area).
121. United States v. Pollard, 466 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir. 1971) (vehicle parked near
defendant's motel room); United States v. Sutton, 341 F. Supp. 320, 321 (W.D. Tenn.
1972) (vehicle parked near defendant's motel room); Skinner v. State, 293 A.2d 828,
831 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (locked vehicle parked in apartment parking lot);
State v. Birdwell, 492 P.2d 249, 253 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (microbus parked in front
of residence).
122. In United States v. Curwood, 338 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1972), an unoccu-
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will uphold a warrantless search made upon probable cause. When a
camper, 123 a trailer, 24 a mobile home,' 2' and an airplane' 20 have ex-
hibited a capability of movement and have been located in a location
that provides some access to routes of escape, exigent circumstances have
been found to exist and a warrantless search has been upheld.
Ill. CLEAR CASES OF IMMOBILITY
A. The Disabled Vehicle
While the vehicle stopped on a highway, or in a public parking lot,
or near the residence of a suspect has almost uniformly 27 been held
to be mobile, the lower courts have been in general agreement that,
under certain circumstances, a searched vehicle is clearly immobile.
One such circumstance is where the searched vehicle is disabled to
such a degree that it cannot move under its own power. The typical
disabled vehicle in this situation is usually approached by officers after
it has been in an accident. Such a case is People v. Railey.'28  In
Railey, a policeman heard an accident report concerning a vehicle, the
driver of which was wanted ,for shoplifting.' 2 He approached the ve-
hicle, conducted a warrantless search, 30 and found marijuana residue
in the bowl of a pipe."' In analyzing the situation, the Colorado court
found no exigent circumstances." 2 It noted that there was no urgency
pied vehicle was found to be mobile because it was backed against a building loading
platform and because the defendants were standing in the vicinity of the vehicle. The
vehicle was capable of movement and enjoyed ready access to roads leading away from
the arrest scene. The dual test of capability for movement and access to routes of
escape was satisfied in this situation.
In United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972), mobility was assumed in
an even more novel situation than that existent in Curwood. In Ortega, a warrantless
search of an automobile enclosed in the hold of a ship was sustained as either a border
search or as an auto search. Id. at 1360-61. Mobility was assumed. The search was
conducted after the vessel had been made fast. The jaguar that was searched possessed
the capability for movement, and the vehicle had ready access to routes of escape,
since the vessel was alongside of a loading dock. Mobility did in fact exist.
123. United States v. Henderson, 469 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1972).
124. United States v. Leon, 460 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1972).
125. United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972).
126. State v. McReynolds, 195 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972).
127. See note 103 supra. But cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See
also notes 312-34 infra and accompanying text.
128. 496 P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1972).





to search,133 and it pointed to the ease with which officers could have
secured a search warrant,"34 but the primary basis for the court's con-
clusion was that the trial court found the vehicle immobile. 3 5 Thus,
the court refused to apply the mobility exception, and it concluded that
the evidence should have been suppressed.'36
Other lower courts have come to the same conclusion when pre-
sented with a disabled vehicle.' 37  The key factor upon which they
rely to classify the vehicle as immobile -is the vehicle's incapability of
movement, when such incapacity is obvious -to the investigating officer
at the point of the initial intrusion.138 When this situation exists, the
officer must secure a warrant prior to search. It should be noted that
an automobile which is only partly disabled may not be found to be
immobile, 3 ' and even a totally disabled vehicle may be searched with-
out a warrant if other circumstances exist which make -an immediate
search necessary.'
40
B. Custodial Care and Other Situations of Immobility
The incapability of movement that is the key factor in requiring a
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. "Mhe trial court found that the defendant's automobile was immobilized,
that the defendant was in custody, and that there was no danger that evidence would be
removed." Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Caraway, 474 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973) (boat disabled
in that it was unoccupied and one of its engines was dismantled on the dock); United
States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.J. 1972) (automobile disabled
because of missing battery); State v. Richards, 296 A.2d 129 (Me. 1972) (automobile
badly damaged and inoperable when police arrived at scene of accident). Contra, Nasi-
ridden v. State, 298 A.2d 490 (Md. Ct. App. 1973). In this case, exigent circumstances
were said to exist when a car was disabled. The defendant was suspected of hit and run
driving and was arrested walking away from his car. He -was returned to his vehicle
by the arresting officers. "'The hood was completely smashed and up, the radiator was
broken, the car was steaming, overheated, the fender was beating up against the side of
the car, [in a] very wrecked condition.'" Id. at 493. The court found exigent circum-
stances without ever stating whether or not the vehicle could move under its own power.
If it could, the court was remiss in neglecting to state this crucial fact. If the car
could not move, the case is wrongly decided.
138. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
139. State v. Bright, 493 P.2d 757 (Ore. CL App. 1972) (auto searched on highway
without driver present and with a flat tire is mobile).
140. People v. Stafford, 29 Cal. App. 3d 940, 106 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1973). Here, the
exigent circumstance was that the defendant was still at large. Also note that this is a
California case; therefore, the court required only probable cause to justify a warrant-
less automobile search. See text accompanying notes 261-301 infra. See also note 212
infra for a discussion of immobility with respect to a vehicle that is found in a ditch
or stuck in the mud.
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search warrant prior to the search of a disabled vehicle is also present
when a vehicle is in a privately-owned closed structure or in police
custody. The police custody situation is perhaps the more obvious of
the two.
When the vehicle is not mobile at the point of initial intrusion,1
4 1
the police may not take the vehicle into custody, conduct a warrantless
search, and thereafter claim that a warrant prior to search was un-
necessary because the search of a vehicle in police custody is an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. 142  Kaufman v. United States'"'
provides an example.
In Kaufman, the defendant robbed a savings and loan association
and then fled by car.144  The flight and police pursuit ended when
Kaufnan's vehicle crashed into a tree. 145  It is essential to note that,
when the pursuing officers came upon the car, it appeared to have
been incapable of movement and, therefore, was immobile at the initial
point of intrusion.146 Police took the defendant into custody, and his
vehicle was towed to a private garage. 1 4  The next evening Kaufman
admitted the robbery to an F.B.I. agent.' 48  Thereafter, the petitioner
was arrested on the federal charge, 49 and Bureau agents executed a
warrantless search of the defendant's car, which was now safely stored
in the garage.150
In holding that the evidence seized by the F.B.I. agents should have
been excluded,' 51 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not rely on
the mechanical disability of the vehicle; 52 rather, it attached signifi-
cance to the fact that the vehicle was 'held on private property.5 8  The
court noted that Kaufman was arrested on other charges by local offi-
cials at 4:40 p.m. and that the federal arrest was authorized shortly
before 7:00 p.m. on the following day. 5 4  When the F.B.I. agents
141. See notes 110-19 supra and accompanying text.
142. In certain circumstances, a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle has
been upheld. These circumstances include police regulations prescribing a limited search
to inventory the contents of the vehicle. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968).
143. 453 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971).







151. Id. at 802.
152. Id. at 802-03.




searched the vehicle over two hours after Kaufman's arrest on federal
charges, there was no danger of the car being removed and there was
ample time to obtain a warrant. 55 Since probable cause for the search
developed after Kaufman's arrest,156 there was no legitimate reason to
conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle at the time of the initial
intrusion. 51 The court did not -refer specifically -to the point where
the initial intrusion occurred, but -the essence of the opinion is that, at
the point of initial intrusion, whether it was at the crash sight or at the
subsequent search conducted by agents on the federal charge, the ve-
hicle was effectively immobilized, and, therefore, a warrantless search
was not reasonable under Coolidge.158
Closely analogous to the Kaufman situation of police custody or
police storage of a vehicle in a private facility is the situation in which
the vehicle is maintained in a private facility over which the law en-
forcement officials have no control. In Kaufman, the police ordered
the vehicle towed to a private garage. The auto was at its place of
storage by direction of the police. Somewhat different is the situation
in which the police first come upon a vehicle when it is parked in
a private garage or in a private parking structure. Such a situation
was presented in Cook v. Johnson. 59
In Johnson, the defendant was arrested prior to the seizure of his




158. Id. at 803. Accord, United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972)
(search for the vehicle identification number while the vehicle was at the police station
and the defendants were in police custody was illegal due to lack of exigent circum-
stances); Leavitt v. Howard, 332 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1971) (vehicle in a police garage
when searched). The point of time in which police custody occurs is sometimes diffi-
cult to ascertain. In State v. Ruiz, 495 P.2d 516 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972), the defendant
accompanied a police officer to the scene of a recent robbery. Ruiz parked his car in
front of the police station prior to his inspection of the robbery scene. Upon his return
to the station, Ruiz was immediately arrested. Police then conducted a warrantless
search of the defendant's vehicle. The court concluded that no exigent circum-
stances were present because Ruiz was in jail and the vehicle was going nowhere. Id.
at 518. The court was obviously unimpressed by the fact that the vehicle was capable
of movement and was parked on a city street. The court must have viewed the point
of initial intrusion as taking place when Ruiz was arrested, not when he first parked the
vehicle. It is as if the court considered the vehicle itself to be in quasi-police custody
at the time of the search. After all, what was the probability of the movement of a vehi-
cle parked in front of a police station with the driver in custody?
159. 459 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1972).
160. Id. at 474
161. Id.
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search of the vehicle two days later revealed incriminating evidence
subsequently introduced at trial.162  The Sixth Circuit reversed the
conviction, indicating that the facts were strikingly similar to the facts
in Coolidge.63 What it did not say, but what is implicit in this de-
cision, is that, if the vehicle stored in a private structure is in no danger
of being driven away by the defendant or his confederates (despite its
capability for movement) and if the circumstances are such that it is
not impracticable for the police to secure a warrant, then the vehicle
is immobile and a search warrant is required.0 This, after all, is
no more than an application of the Coolidge rationale to a stored ve-
hicle. 6 5 What is particularly significant is the fact that the defendant
was arrested away from the structure in which the automobile was
stored and away from the location of the vehicle itself. If it is on
private property away from the arrest scene and if it is enclosed in a
storage facility, the car may be immobile, but if it is on a public street or
highway, the vehicle is considered mobile. 66
IV. THE DIFFICULT CASES OF MOBILITY
The lower courts have displayed varying degrees of disagreement
over the legality of a warrantless search of a vehicle conducted in
situations where, at the point of the initial intrusion by law enforce-
ment officials, the auto is on private property not in the vicinity of
the defendant's residence. The vehicle may be enclosed in a private
parking structure, 67 it may be left at -a service station while the defend-
ant is out of the area of immediate access to the vehicle, 108 or it
162. Id.
163. Id. at 475.
164. See also Lewis v. Cardwell, 476 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973). In this case the gov-
ernment did not assert that the mobility exception justified the warrantless search of the
defendant's car. The vehicle was parked one-half block from state offices in a day
parking facility; a wrecker had originally been secured to seize the auto; and the govern-
ment had planned for several weeks to seize the vehicle.
165. See notes 72-101 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 102-19 supra and accompanying text. The emphasis that the Sixth
Circuit places on the fact that the car is located in a private structure is misguided.
The fact that a vehicle is located within a private structure does not necessarily negate
the capability of movement. If confederates have keys to the vehicle or have any other
means to move the vehicle, it would not appear to matter whether the vehicle is on the
highway or in a private garage, but since there was no evidence of confederates in the
Johnson case, the court did not have to deal with this issue.
167. Cook v. Johnson, 459 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1972) (seizure of accused's
vehicle from his garage after he was in police custody invalid).
168. United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973) (trailer in a deserted
part of private property was hitched to an unoccupied tractor with the air brake set);
United States v. Ellison, 469 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1972) (vehicle parked at loading dock
and ready to be moved); Bailey v. State, 294 A.2d 123 (Me. 1972) (search of a vehicle
[Vol. 7
MOBILITY EXCEPTION
may be a getaway car simply abandoned at the time it is discovered by
the police. In these situations, the lower courts have usually upheld
the warrantless vehicle search on the ground that exigent circum-
stances justified the police search. 169 Courts disagree as to the exist-
ence of exigent circumstances (1) when an unoccupied vehicle is
parked on private property with the suspect not within the immediate
area of the vehicle,"'0 (2) when a vehicle is seemingly abandoned, 7"
(3) when confederates, friends, or relatives of the suspect continue
to have access to the vehicle after the police withdraw from the
scene,"72 and (4) when the subject of the search is not a mechanized
vehicle, but a suitcase or container.
173
A. The Vehicle Parked on Private Property
A vehicle parked on private property has usually been considered
mobile."' 4  Here again the dual test of mobility--capability for move-
ment and ready access for flight to the open highway-is met. In
Bailey v. State,175 a more difficult assessment of mobility with respect
to an enclosed vehicle was avoided. In Bailey, the police made an
initial search of the vehicle when the car was parked on a service sta-
tion lot at 3:30 a.m."Y6 A second warrantless search at 9:30 a.m. was
conducted while the car was in a closed repair bay and under the pro-
tective watch of a service station attendant."'7 The court did not at-
tempt to judge the mobility of the automobile at the time of the second
search, since it concluded that, at the time of this search, the vehicle had
been effectively seized by the police. Thus, the second search was legiti-
mate because based on the justified initial intrusion (the 3:30 a.m.
search). 
7 8
Had this warrantless search not been upheld on the basis of the prior
parked on the grounds of a service station); State v. Johnson, 490 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1973)
(vehicle leaving loading dock at time of stop). Contra, State v. Bertram, 504 P.2d 520
(Ariz. 1972) (vehicle parked on private property and defendant not in proximity of the
vehicle); State v. Pound, 508 P.2d 118 (Mont. 1973) (defendant locked in a trailer and
denied access to his vehicle, which was parked on private property).
169. See cases cited in note 168 supra.
170. See notes 174-200 infra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 200-13 infra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 213-34 infra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 235-60 infra and accompanying text.
174. United States v. Ellison, 469 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1972).
175. 294 A.2d 123 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
176. Id. at 134.
177. Id. at 135.
178. Id.
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search, would it have been valid under the Coolidge rationale? The
basis of lower court opinions indicates that the outcome would not
have been different ,had ithe police made the initial intrusion when
the car was in the closed bay. The vehicle still retained the capability
for movement: it was mechanically sound and it enjoyed ready access
for flight. Service station repair bays are usually constructed with doors
that easily roll open, and one could walk up to the vehicle, raise the
closed door, and drive away in seconds. An enclosed vehicle is not
made immobile by the fact of enclosure. In this situation, the repair
bay would have to be locked for the car to be considered immobile.
Where the vehicle is not enclosed, but is simply locked and unoc-
cupied at the time of the initial intrusion, lower courts have considered
the vehicle to be mobile. In Harris v. State, 79 "Cadillac Joe" was
arrested inside the China Doll Lounge. 80 With probable cause to be-
lieve Joe was transporting heroin, the officers searched him but did
not find the contraband.181  They subsequently took Joe back to his
Cadillac, which the officers knew to be locked and unoccupied, and
there they conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. 8 2 Heroin was
found, 83 and Joe was convicted.'8 4  In upholding the search, the
Texas court concluded that the vehicle was mobile within the meaning
of Carroll.18 5 Coolidge was distinguished from the case at bar in that
the defendant in Coolidge was already-in jail when the search of his
Pontiac was conducted.'8 6 No evaluation of the point of initial in-
trusion was attempted. Instead, Commissioner Davis argued that to
arrest the suspect without searching the car or to conduct a search only
after a search warrant was obtained, would have been an intrusion upon
the appellant's rights.18 7
The analysis in Harris appears to be an extreme departure from the
plurality opinion in Coolidge, with Justice Stewart's emphasis on the
importance of the warrant requirement and the narrowness with which
179. 486 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1972).





185. Id. at 90.
186. Id.
187. Id. Commissioner Davis noted:
Having searched appellant and found no contraband, would the officers have
been justified in taking appellant into custody to await the procuring of a search
warrant for the car and the execution of same? Such a course of action would




the exceptions to the requirement are to be viewed.' 88 But the lower
courts have given far broader reading to what constitutes exigent cir-
cumstances than can be envisioned from a reading of the Coolidge plur-
ality. The fact that a car is locked and its owner is not near the vehicle
at the time of search does not make the car immobile. 18 9 Other cir-
cumstances must exist for the vehicle to be immobile for fourth amend-
ment purposes. Such circumstances are illustrated by In re J.R.M. g0
In J.R.M., the police -located a vehicle in the defendant's driveway
and identified it as that allegedly involved in a murder.' 9 ' The de-
fendant and his father, however, were not questioned until the next
day.192 Subsequent to that questioning, the vehicle could not be located
for three days.' 93 It was ultimately found by police officers in a parking
space rented by the defendant's father.' At no time prior to or af-
ter the questioning did the police attempt to obtain a search war-
rant. 95 Instead, upon advice of the prosecuting attorney's office that
the evidence was insufficient for the issuance of a warrant, they exec-
uted a warrantless search."96  Reliance here was on the mobility ex-
ception to the warrant requirement as discussed in Chambers. 97  Thir-
teen days after the seizure of the vehicle the defendant was arrested. 98
The J.R.M. facts, on close analysis, are strikingly similar to the facts
in Coolidge. In both cases, the vehicle was located on private property,
and, more importantly, in both situations the police knew prior to the
initial intrusion that the vehicle was directly connected to the crime be-
ing investigated and they knew that a search of the vehicle would be
a necessary part of the investigation. Police knowledge thus provided
the ability to secure a warrant. The opportunity to search was not
"fleeting." In applying Coolidge to invalidate the search, the court sig-
nificantly relied upon the factor of police knowledge. The opinion
concluded:
188. 403 U.S. at 453.
189. People v. Bukoski, 200 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1972). In upholding the warrant-
less search, the court relied on the fact that the defendants were at large at the point of
initial intrusion. Id. at 377. The Court looked "not to the fact of movement, but to
the ease of movement." Id.
190. 487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972).
191. Id. at 503.
192. Id. at 503-04.
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We are unable to distinguish the Coolidge case from the one with which
we here deal. Here the police knew of the red Corvair from the begin-
ning and knew of its possible connecotion with the crime. They traced
the car and observed it at the home of appellant on the day the body
was found. They talked to appellant and his father about the crime.
Necessarily, appellant knew that he was a suspect. An opportunity to
dispose of the car or destroy any evidence existed if there was an in-
clination to do that, but there was no evidence of flight by appellant
or of an effort to destroy evidence. At the time the car was seized it
was parked and locked on a downtown lot regularly rented by appel-
lant's father. The police knew of this parking space belonging to ap-
pellant's father because on previous occasions they had helped him start
his car on that very lot. The car was not being driven on the highway,
as in Chambers, where the court felt that the situation was such that
if the officers had not seized the car at that time, it could and probably
would have been driven away and subsequently not been available for
seizure under a search warrant if obtained. The officers did not claim
that the automobile contained any contraband or stolen articles.' 99
This case is precedent for the position that a warrant should be
secured prior to a search when a vehicle is parked on private property,
when law enforcement officials possess the knowledge that the vehicle
is to be searched as part of the investigation, and when the police sub-
sequently locate the vehicle prior to the initial intrusion. Here the
mobility exception may not lie. A court might read the Coolidge
opinion as invalidating the warrantless search. Under such circum-
stances, a vehicle, locked or unlocked, may be immobile in the eyes of
the law. 0 °
199. Id. at 511.
200. See also Caldwell v. Canady, 340 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Stoddard v.
Texas, 475 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1972). In Stoddard, the police possessed
knowledge of the location of the defendant's vehicle (a parking lot on the campus of
the University of Texas at Austin) 2k hours prior to the initial intrusion, and
they knew that the defendant was already in custody. Id. at 751. The court reasoned
that it was practicable for the officers to secure a warrant prior to the search (id. at
752), which was the initial intrusion. The vehicle was judged immobile and the con-
viction was reversed. In this situation, where the time lapse (2% hours) between
reception of the information and the subsequent search was relatively brief and where
friends and associates of the defendant had access to the vehicle, the court might have
been influenced by the defendant's personal character and potential sentence. The de-
fendant enjoyed office space on campus; he was thus likely to be either a teacher or
graduate student The sentence he faced was severe. Texas law at this time mandated
an automatic prison sentence of two years to life for marijuana possession for first of-
fenders and an automatic 10 year minimum sentence for second offenders. Tux PENAL
CoDE art. 725b § 23 (1961), as amended, 725b § 23 (1973). Given these circumstances
the judge may have stretched the Coolidge rationale to reach what he considered a mer-
ciful disposition of the case.
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B. The Abandoned Auto
A second situation in which mobility may not exist involves circum-
stances which indicate that the vehicle has been abandoned by poten-
tial suspects to a crime. This circumstance runs through a line of
cases 0 1 in which judges have been faced with factul situations in which
the mobility of the vehicle that was the subject of a warrantless search
is open to serious question. Unsure of the reach of the Coolidge opin-
ion, yet unwilling to rule for the suppression of evidence that would
allow criminal acts to go unpunished, several courts have circumvented
Coolidge by contending that, if the vehicle has been abandoned, no
one had standing to object to the search. 20 2  In each of these deci-
sions, all handed down in 1972203 (the year following Coolidge), the
court found that the vehicle had been abandoned, thus avoiding the
impact of Coolidge and ultimately upholding the searches. 204  These
courts thus avoided the mobility issue by pigeonholing facts of a case
beneath the umbrella of abandonment.
A case which exemplifies this line of judicial withdrawal is Kurtz
v. People.20 5  In Kurtz, police arrived upon a robbery scene to find
a body lying beside a vehicle identified as belonging to the robbers,
who had already fled the scene of the crime. 20 6 The victim was one
of -two people who had tried to contain the robbers within the store
until the police arrived.20 7 Inside his pocket the police found the keys
to the getaway car.208 Police then searched the car without a war-
rant.
209
Faced with these facts, the court could have reasoned that the car
was mobile at the initial intrusion by police, or at least it could have
concluded that, since armed robbers were still at large in the early
morning darkness and since the vehicle possessed the capability of
movement and of ready access to routes of escape, exigent circum-
stances existed which justified a warrantless search. But the decision
was written in 1972, and the court may have been reluctant to rely
201. United States v. Gulledge, 469 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1972); Kurtz v. People, 494
P.2d 97 (Colo. 1972); People v. Smith, 278 N.E.2d 73 (111.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1022 (1972); Love v. State, 487 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
202. 469 F.2d at 715; 494 P.2d at 102-03; 278 N.E.2d at 73; 487 S.W.2d at 677.
203. 469 F.2d at 713; 494 P.2d at 97; 278 N.E.2d at 74; 487 S.W.2d at 677.
204. 469 F.2d at 718; 494 P.2d at 103; 278 N.E.2d at 75; 487 S.W.2d at 677.
205. 494 P.2d 97 (Colo. 1972).
206. Id. at 100.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 102.
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on Coolidge and subsequent cases to justify this search on mobility
grounds. The court might have been unwilling to stretch the defini-
tion of mobility to the situation in which law enforcement officials had
obtained keys to the car at the point of initial intrusion. The defend-
ant contended that the evidence was improperly seized as the result
of a warrantless search of an immobile vehicle,2 10 but the court refused
to consider the substance of the argument. The refusal was founded
upon defendant's lack of standing to raise the defense,21' which was
predicated on the court's finding that the vehicle was abandoned.212
C. Confederates and Family Not in Custody
Whereas the conclusion that a vehicle is abandoned avoids the need
to determine whether or not a vehicle is mobile, the finding that con-
federates or family members are out of custody at the point of the initial
intrusion and will remain out of custody when the police depart is jus-
tification for considering the vehicle mobile.213
Typical of the cases in which a family member in the area of a ve-
hicle justifies a warrantless search is United States v. Menke.21 4 In
Menke, a parcel containing marijuana was uncovered in a warrant-
less search of appellant's car, which was parked on his property.213
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Accord, People v. Smith, 278 N.E.2d 73 (Ill.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1022
(1972). In Smith, police pursued a Plymouth until it skidded off the road and into a
ditch. By the time police came upon the vehicle, the defendants had fled into a nearby
field. The car was removed to a garage, the defendants were arrested, and the Plymouth
was searched six hours later. Id. at 74. The opinion upheld the introduction of evi-
dence secured in the search by labelling the car abandoned. Chambers was cited, but
Coolidge was not mentioned, and a discussion of the mobility of a vehicle left in a ditch
with no potential driver within sight was not attempted. The court apparently did not
want to deal with the question of when a car that is mechanically capable of movement
becomes immobile by virtue of its physical environment. For an opinion that did deal
with this difficult question, see United States v. Babich, 347 F. Supp. 157 (D. Nev.
1972), affl'd, 477 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1973). In Babich, the court held that a truck em-
bedded in a dry lake and abandoned by its driver and passengers could still be the subject
of a warrantless search. The logic here was that the truck could be dug out and towed
away without great difficulty. Id. at 160. In this type of situation, where it is im-
possible for a court to determine the difficulties of the movement of a vehicle which is
mechanically sound, courts are likely to find the vehicle mobile, as the court did in this
case. Natural elements such as mud, snow, wind, rain, etc., will not induce the courts
to consider a vehicle immobile for fourth amendment purposes unless objective data indi-
cate that the vehicle could not move.
213. See note 228 infra.
214. 468 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1972).
215. Id. at 21-22.
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In upholding the admission of the parcel into evidence,216 the court
based its finding of exigent circumstances on the presence of the de-
fendant's mother, father, and sister at the place of search. 217  Since
they were not taken into custody,2  they could have moved the car
or removed the evidence from the vehicle. When family members
will remain in the vicinity of the vehicle, it is clear that a warrantless
search will be upheld. 219  The fact that those related to the defendant
may not be involved in the crime to which he is accused will not deter
courts from finding exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless
search. Of course, where there is any suspicion that those in the area
of the vehicle are confederates of the suspect, lower courts will rely
upon such facts to uphold a warrantless search.220
Typical of this reliance is United States v. Ellis.221  In Ellis, a ve-
hicle suspected of being used in a bank robbery was located in the
bank parking lot.222  The car was locked;223 the police were in pos-
session of the key to the ignition;224 and there was no evidence that
the vehicle had been recently driven.225  The court concluded that the
vehicle was mobile.2 26  The basis for the decision was that persons
acting for the defendants could have removed the car or evidence con-
tained in the car since two of the robbers were still at large and since
the vehicle would be left unattended while police secured a warrant.227
Other courts have relied on the fact that confederates of the defendant
are still at large to justify a conclusion that exigent circumstances or
mobility justified a warrantless search. 228  In several instances, judges
216. Id. at 20.
217. Id. at 23.
218. Id.
219. See United States v. Pointer, 348 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (defendant's
father was present when a truck was searched on the lot of a service station); People v.
Hurley, 293 N.E.2d 341 (111. Ct. App. 1973) (mother not present at scene of search,
but her ownership of vehicle was evidence that she could move the vehicle or remove the
evidence); People v. Dockery, 278 N.E.2d 147 (111. Ct. App. 1971) (an uncle actually
tried to move the vehicle before the police could search it); State v. LaPorte, 301 A.2d
146 (N.L 1973) (fact that defendant's wife drove the car often and possessed a duplicate
key provided enough evidence to conclude the car is mobile).
220. See cases cited in note 228 infra.
221. 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 866 (1972).




226. Id. at 966.
227. Id.
228. United States v. Castaldi, 453 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
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have assumed confederates of the defendant existed without any cor-
roborating evidence before the court. 29
One case in which this assumption was made is Peterson v. State.23 0
In Peterson, all passengers and a driver of a vehicle parked in a parking
lot were arrested prior to a search of the vehicle.23' Instead of a dis-
,cussion of mobility at the point of initial intrusion, the court em-
phasized the fact that the automobile was located in a high crime
area.232 The vehicle was mobile because:
[I]t was vulnerable in its position to confederates in the well-organized
underworld of the narcotics traffic. Its suspected contents were readily
destructible. In that bustling marketplace of narcotics users, it was fur-
ther an inviting target for theft by any tempted or opportunistic
"junkie.,,233
No evidence other than the nature of the crime itself was offered
to indicate that confederates of those arrested were outside of custody.
Two other courts have accepted mobility arguments based on confed-
erates at large (but without direct evidence to support such allega-
tions) to help justify affirming convictions based on a warrantless ve-
hicle search.2 , 4  Though these cases that seem to "manufacture" con-
federates appear to be rare, the factor of confederates at large is usu-
ally not determinative of the result, because usually mobility could be
upheld on other grounds. With respect to the search of containers
and suitcases, however, this is not the case.
D. The Container Search: A Clear Case of Confusion
The warrantless search of containers (e.g., suitcases) has often been
upheld by the mobility exception. 23 5  Although the lower courts are in
substantial disagreement with respect to the requirement of a search
warrant prior to the search of a suitcase,236 the majority of challenged
suitcase searches reported since Coolidge have been upheld.23 7 This
outcome is somewhat predictable, given the two-pronged test for
917 (1972); State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 498 P.2d 444 (Ariz. 1972); People v.
Munoz, 21 Cal. App. 3d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971).
229. See note 234 infra.
230. 292 A.2d 714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
231. Id. at 717.
232. Id. at 718.
233. Id. at 722.
234. United States ex reL Johnson v. Johnson, 340 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Scales v. State, 284 A.2d 45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971).
235. See notes 250-51 infra.




mobility established above-capability for movement and ready access
to an avenue of flight so as to make the opportunity to search a fleeting
one for law enforcement personnel.
People v. McKinnon 3 is perhaps the most notable case upholding
a warrantless container search. In McKinnon, an air freight agent of
United Airlines became suspicious of five cardboard cartons scheduled
for air shipment.23 Upon his examination of the contents of the car-
tons, he found bricks of marijuana.2 40 The agent left the cartons open
so as to avoid the possibility of an unlawful search and seizure241 and
then notified the police.2 42 The defendant was subsequently arrested
when he attempted to board his plane.243 In upholding the seizure,
the California Supreme Court applied the logic of the mobility excep-
tion to the search and seizure of the cartons. It interpreted the mobil-
ity doctrine as applying to "motorcars or other things readily moved. 244
The containers consigned to the common carrier were thus mobile. The
court discussed Coolidge240 and noted that, in the case at bar, the
police had not known for some time of the packages or what they
contained.2 40  The packages were scheduled for flight out of the juris-
diction, thus making the opportunity to search fleeting. 24 7  Since the
agent of the airline was acting as a private individual (thus not requiring
a warrant to search),248 probable cause was legitimately obtained by
the police, and the search was justified.
This application of the Coolidge rationale appears to be consistent
with prevailing interpretations. By itself, a container cannot move, but
once it is in the possession of a common carrier, it has the capability
for movement. The ready access to an avenue of flight is the result
of the scheduled departure of the container. If the scheduled depar-
ture from the jurisdiction is so immediate as to make it impracticable
to secure a search warrant, the opportunity to search is fleeting and
a warrantless search is valid.249 In State v. Fassler250 and United
238. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 900, 500 P.2d at 1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 900. For an analysis of the
McKinnon decision, see The Supreme Court of California, 1971-1972, 61 CALM'. L.
REv. 287, 497 (1973); 41 FoRDnHV L. REV. 1034 (1973).
241. 7 Cal. 3d at 904, 500 P.2d at 1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
245. Id. at 910-11, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
246. Id. at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 911-12, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
249. Contra, United States v. Valen, 348 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In Valen,
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States v. Johnson,25 ' as in McKinnon, the mobility exception of Cool-
idge was used to uphold the warrantless search of a suitcase. A suitcase
found in a search of a mobile vehicle, of course, may be searched with-
out warrant2 52 because, at the time of the initial intrusion, the suitcase
a warrantless search of suitcases by a customs official at an Arizona airport was in-
validated because there were no exigent circumstances. The court rested its decision
on the grounds that the suitcases were transported, not by the passenger, but by an in-
dependent carrier, that there was no possibility of an en route variance and that officials
could have notified officials at either New York (the place of departure) or Scranton
(the destination) in time to secure a warrant. Given these circumstances and the pres-
ence of a government official to prevent reclamation at the Arizona airport, a warrant
was required for the search. Id. at 1167-68. The logic here seems strained. The fact
that the route of the airplane was known is not significant. Often the route of an au-
tomobile on roads in rural areas can be predicted, yet this does not negate the vehicle's
mobility. To allow the suitcases on the flight is to risk the loss of the suitcases and
their contents by theft or baggage loss, diversion of the flight, or diversion of the suit-
case on a subsequent flight. Even if such a risk of loss were to be discounted, the suit-
case, once in the hands of the common carrier, possessed the capability for move-
ment and for direct access to other jurisdictions. That it was impracticable to secure a
warrant in Valen was not in dispute. The agent testified that it would have taken from
four to six hours to secure a warrant in Tucson. This testimony was not disputed. Id.
at 1165. For customs officials at the Tucson airport, the opportunity to search was
fleeting. The later opportunity to search by unidentified law enforcement officials in
Scranton or in New York is immaterial to the right of agents in Tucson to search the
suitcases. The Coolidge test appears satisfied, and, therefore, the evidence should not
have been suppressed.
250. 503 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1972).
251. 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1972). In Johnson, police officers apprehended one sus-
pect to a bank robbery at an apartment located in the vicinity of the bank. Another
suspect was apprehended as a result of a telephone tip from an informant. The inform-
ant also tipped the police that two suitcases belonging to one of the suspects could be
found outside of a ghetto building near a rear door and that one of the suitcases con-
tained a shotgun. The police, without a warrant, rushed to the specified location, seized'
the suitcases, and conducted an immediate search, which uncovered a sawed-off shot-
gun. Id. at 634. In upholding the search, the court cited Coolidge (id. at 639) and
concluded:
Ml't was not practical to secure a warrant because the suitcases could have been
removed from their position outside the apartment building at any moment. The
suitcases in this situation were similar to mobile automobiles. It was there-
fore likely that the opportunity to seize the suitcases would have passed if the
officers had waited to secure a warrant.
Id. The court then stated that the police properly opened the suitcase to see whether
they were holding a dangerous weapon of which they had no control in a high crime
area. Id. at 639. Although the application of Coolidge in this unique case is a strained
attempt to uphold a snap decision of law enforcement officials in a situation of great po-
tential danger, it should be noted that mobility is inferred by location-the suitcase was
mobile because it rested in a high crime area with probable visibility to bystanders. Id.
Access for flight is supplied by location. Since one must infer that the capability for
movement is supplied by a high likelihood of theft, the mobility rationale seems inap-
propriate. The correct police response would have been to seize the suitcases, but re-
frain from opening them until a warrant could be secured.
252. See United States v. Rothberg, 345 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Soles v.
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possesses both the capability for movement and an access to routes of
escape. Once again, it is the point of initial intrusion at which exigent
circumstances are evaluated. If the container is not mobile at the point
of the initial intrusion, the exigent circumstance requirement of Cool-
idge is not met and a warrant prior to search is necessary.
In Erickson,2 53 for example, a locked suitcase was delivered to the
police station by a citizen. 254  An officer opened the suitcase in the
presence of two other policemen, a district attorney, and a district
court judge, 255 but he did not secure a warrant. 256  The search was not
conducted to determine the ownership of lost property since the police
knew the owner of the suitcase.257  The court reasoned that:
[S]uitcases can be analogized to automobiles in search and seizure
cases. The United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire . . . made it clear that the presence of an exigency exception to
the warrant requirement must be determined under the factual circum-
stances of the search rather than the abstract potential for mobility or
destruction of the thing to be searched.
2 58
The court concluded that the search was unreasonable, 5 9 the implica-
tion being clear that the suitcase was not mobile. And indeed it was
not. At both the point of the police reception of the suitcase and
at the point of search, the suitcase was immobile. It had no ca-
pability for movement unless law enforcement personnel chose to pro-
vide the capability. The presence of a judge at the search of the suit-
case establishes that a warrant could easily have been secured. It was
therefore required for this search.26
State, 299 A.2d 502 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). For a case upholding a suitcase search
as valid under an inventory prior to a vehicle's storage in a police garage, see People v.
Sullivan, 272 N.E.2d 464 (N.Y. 1971). Contra, State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del.
1972) (search of a closed satchel found in trunk of inventoried auto was improper).
253. 507 P.2d 508 (Alas. 1973).
254. Id. at 512.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 511-12.
258. Id. at 516.
259. Id.
260. See United States v. Colbert, 454 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case, police
officers observed two men carrying expensive brief cases outside of a nightclub. The
officers then proceeded to stop, question, and frisk the two men. With no basis to de-
tain the men, the officers did not prevent them from walking away. But in walking away,
both men left their briefcases on the sidewalk. At that point the officers again stopped
the two defendants, and the men were arrested when they failed to comply with a request
to produce their Selective Service cards. While the defendants were in the squad car,
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The cases involving the container search, the abandoned auto, the
vehicle parked on private property, and the identification of confeder-
ates at large (as an indicator of mobility) all exemplify the extent to
which some lower courts have gone in allowing warrantless searches.
These cases highlight the analysis of individual courts, but the cases
do not indicate the evolution that occurred within each jurisdiction as
the courts struggled to apply Coolidge. Perhaps the most unique evo-
lution has occurred in California.
V. CALIFORNIA: SOMETIMES A DIFFERENT NOTION
Unlike other jursidictions, 261 California has substantially deviated
from the Coolidge requirement that a warrantless search of a vehicle
is valid only upon a showing of both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances.262  The progression of -these California cases displays a
general resistence to the Coolidge requirements for a legal warrantless
search; it is as if the California courts were denying by outcome what
the Supreme Court had mandated by decision. The Supreme Court
had proposed the policy; the California courts followed with a different
practice.
The California cases decided immediately after the Coolidge opin-
ion display a hesitancy to tackle the confused question of mobility.
2 3
the briefcases were searched. Each was found to contain a sawed-off shotgun with an
illegal barrel length. In invalidating the search, the court noted that neither of the de-
fendants had access to the briefcases at the time of search and that the briefcases were
not within their immediate control at the time of arrest. Id. at 803-04. The court con-
cluded that the briefcases were immobile under Coolidge and that it was "practicable"
to secure a warrant prior to the opening of the briefcases. Id. at 804. However, the
court erred in its conclusion that it was irrelevant that a search could have been con-
ducted at the precise time of frisk or arrest (id. at 803-04), for as previously noted (see
text accompanying notes 108-19 supra), the point of initial intrusion is the key to an
evaluation of whether exigent circumstances exist. The court seemed to sense its own
mistake, and in an en bane rehearing, the court avoided the mobility issue by classify-
ing the suitcases as abandoned. In so holding, the defendants were denied standing to
challenge the introduction of the evidence secured via the search.
261. See cases cited in note 103 supra.
262. Id.
263. In People v. Munoz, 21 Cal. App. 3d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971), defendants
were arrested a short distance away from their vehicle. The court dwelled on the prob-
able cause question, not on the exigent circumstances requirement. In emphasizing the
reasonableness of the search and the factors that distinguished this case from Coolidge,
the court refrained from a statement of the Coolidge requirements for a warrantlegs
search. Id. at 810, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 761. In Mestas v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App.
3d 736, 99 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1972), the defendant was arrested for burglary. His car was
parked around the corner from the scene of arrest (the distance from the car to the point
of arrest was estimated at a distance of about four houses). Id. at 742, 99 Cal. Rptr. at
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People v. Munoz264 and People v. Farley265 both suggested that the test
of the warrantless search of a vehicle was the general test of reason-
ableness. 266  However, neither opinion attempted an incisive analysis
of the Coolidge case.
The first such analysis of the Coolidge two-pronged test of a war-
rantless search was delivered by Justice Fleming in Brantner v. Supe-
rior Court.267 In Branter, the defendant was arrested at the scene
of a car accident for being under the influence of narcotics. 26 8 His
van was towed out of the mud to a police storage area,269 where it
was then searched and found to contain restricted dangerous drugs. 70
Although the search was held valid as a search incident to arrest,
2 71
the court stated that the key -to a search of a vehicle in California
was the test of reasonableness. 2 72 Based on a test of reasonableness,
this search, conducted ten to fifteen minutes after arrest in a storage
area a few miles away from the scene of arrest, was not too remote
to be improper.2 7 3  A later search of the auto was justified by the
initial right to search. 4  The court did not stop there; it went on
to distinguish the California approach to the search of a vehicle from
the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court.2 7 5 In Justice
Fleming's view, California courts, in a line of cases both preceding
and subsequent to Coolidge, held that facts which justify an arrest also
justify the search of a vehicle. 6  The Supreme Court's view is that
the facts must justify the search of a vehicle independent of a justifica-
590. Approximately thirty minutes subsequent to the arrest, the vehicle was im-
pounded, and an inventory of the unlocked truck revealed evidence later used to secure
the defendant's conviction. The court upheld the search of the vehicle. It relied on
Chambers as requiring probable cause at the initial intrusion, but the court refused to
discuss the mobility aspect of the case. The court remanded the case for further hearing
in light of Coolidge without giving the trial court guidance as to what Coolidge required
for a valid warrantless search. Id. at 581.
264. Id.
265. 20 Cal. App. 3d 1032,98 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1971).
266. Id. at 1037, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 92; People v. Munoz, 21 Cal. App. 3d 805, 810,
98 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760 (1971).
267. 100 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1972), rehearing granted, Apr. 19, 1972.
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tion to arrest the defendant. 7  The opinion then concludes: "[O]nly
when the vehicle search has no immediate relationship to the facts
which justify the arrest does this theoretical difference between state
and federal law assume practical importance. ' 278  The result of the
California view (as interpreted in Brantner), that the facts that justify
the arrest (probable cause) also justify a warrantless search4 of the
auto, effectively excludes the requirement of exigent circumstances;
any vehicle, mobile or not, can be immediately searched. Following this
logic, a car without a motor or a plane without an engine could be
searched without a warrant because the question of exigent circum-
stances, i.e., the question of mobility, is never reached. The Coolidge
decision is thus effectively ignored and a general test of reasonableness
is the criterion to judge a warrantless vehicle search .1 9  But how can
most of the California courts resist the logical force of Supreme Court
precedent? This question was answered by the California Supreme
Court in People v. McKinnon.2 80
Speaking for the McKinnon majority, Justice Mosk argued that the
entire discussion of the mobility doctrine in Coolidge was not binding
on the California courts:
[T]hat portion of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which purports to
narrow the Carroll-Chambers rule was in any event signed by only four
members of the court (Stewart, J., Douglas J., Brennan, J. and Marshall
J.). Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan declined to
join Part II B of the opinion ... and the four remaining justices ex-
pressly disagreed with Justice Stewart on this point. It follows that the
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. The Coolidge decision was not ignored by all California courts. The court of
appeal of the fifth district attempted to follow Coolidge in People v. Koehn, 25 Cal.
App. 3d 799, 102 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1972). In this case, the defendant was stopped by the
police while driving on a city street. The stop was justified by the existence of an out-
standing arrest warrant for the passenger riding with the defendant. Both were ar-
rested for carrying a concealed weapon when an officer observed a gun in plain view
on the floorboard. The car was then immediately searched without a warrant. Using
a bar, the police opened a locked tire well and found a fiberboard suitcase. The open-
ing of the suitcase disclosed marijuana and a locked metal box, and inside the box the
officers found heroin. Id. at 802. The court invalidated the search, denying the ap-
plicability of both the search incident to an arrest and the mobility exceptions
to the warrant requirement. With specific reference to Coolidge and Chambers, the
court concluded that exigent circumstances are required for a warrantless auto search.
Id. at 803. The analysis here is that the warrantless search of the tire was not needed
for the safety of the officers and that there was no danger of the vehicle being moved,
since the suspects were handcuffed and in the squad car at the time of search. Id. at
805.
280. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
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Carroll-Chambers issue raised by the plurality opinion in Coolidge was
in fact considered by an equally divided court, and hence was not actually
decided: under settled doctrine, the judgment of an equally divided
United States Supreme Court "is without force as precedent." Thus we
are bound to apply the Carroll-Chambers rules according to our present
understanding of its scope.281
But Justice Mosk's analysis ignored the fact that five members of the
court signed section R-D of Justice Stewart's opinion,282 a portion of
the opinion which specifically required the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances to justify a warrantless search.28 3 On the other hand, Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion in part i-B inexplicably left open the question
of whether or not Coolidge principles would apply to a search for con-
traband, stolen goods, or dangerous material.2 s4 Thus, the McKinnon
court was free to apply the Carroll-Chambers rule and the court pro-
ceeded to formulate the rule that a warrantless search of a vehicle
or mobile container for contraband, weapons, or stolen goods could
be based upon a showing of probable cause 285 without a further show-
ing of exigent circumstances.
The response of the lower court cases to the McKinnon rule was
generally one of compliance-only probable cause being required to
search a vehicle for contraband, stolen goods, or weapons. 28   But now
the lower courts have a more recent statement of law from the Cali-
281. Id. at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905, quoting Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263, 264 (1960) (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice Peters argued that five
members of the United States Supreme Court joined in Section II-D of the Coolidge
opinion and that this section adopted exigent circumstances as a requirement of a war-
rantless vehicle search. Id. at 921, 500 P.2d at 1112, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
282. 403 U.S. at 444.
283. Id. at 478.
284. Id. at 458-64.
285. 7 Cal. 3d at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The position that
exigent circumstances are required to search a vehicle only if the material sought is not
contraband, not weaponry, or not stolen, is in accord with the view of Justice White in
his dissenting opinion in Coolidge. 403 U.S. at 519. He argued that, since the vast ma-
jority of vehicular searches are aimed at the discovery of weapons, contraband, or stolen
goods, the test of the legitimacy of a warrantless vehicle search becomes one of prob-
able cause (often referred to as reasonableness). Id.
286. People v. Laursen, 8 Cal. 3d 192, 201, 501 P.2d 1145, 1151, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425,
431 (1972); North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 305, 307, 502 P.2d 1305, 1307, 104
Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 (1972); People v. Hill, 32 Cal. App. 3d 18, 107 Cal. Rptr. 791
(1973); People v. Stafford, 29 Cal. App. 3d 940, 947, 106 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1973);
People v. Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 816, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1972). In Hill,
the fourth district court of appeal relied on the McKinnon analysis to validate both an
onscene search of a vehicle at the point of arrest (id. at 38, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 807) and a
later search of the car after it had been impounded (id. at 41, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 810).
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fornia Supreme Court with respect to the warrantless search of an
automobile; the different notion of McKinnon has seemingly been
abandoned. This new statement is made in People v. Dumas.2 87
People v. Dumas is an extraordinary opinion. It bears close analy-
sis because of its amazing extension of the valid warrantless search;
an extension that goes far beyond the limits of the auto search and
far beyond the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Dumas
also bears inspection because the court, although abandoning the
Coolidge theory in application, suddenly and without explanation
seems to adopt it in principle. In Dumas, law enforcement officials
secured a search warrant to search defendant's apartment and trash
for stolen railroad bonds and bank checks, narcotics, and narcotics
paraphernalia.-" A search of the premises specified in the warrant
revealed only a young woman, an auto registration certificate, and a
set of car keys.289 A car matching the description of the certificate
was found parked on the street about one hundred feet away from the
defendant's apartment.2 90 Although the vehicle was not mentioned
in the warrant, it was searched, and stolen bonds and narcotics were
seized.29' In a rather strained opinion the search was upheld.20 2 Justice
Mosk 'began his opinion by stating the general proposition that the test
of whether or not a warrant is required is one of reasonableness: 20 3
the same test that was used by McKinnon.2 "4  But then Mosk discussed
Carroll as requiring probable cause and exigent circumstances for a
The case involved a defendant stopped by an officer for running a stop sign. Since the
defendant had run several stop signs and had driven at high speeds to avoid citation, he
was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car after his vehicle was stopped. The
court upheld the warrantless search in that most of the material seized (marijuana cig-
arettes, a pouch containing marijuana, several wallets, and a large roll of money) was
in plain view. In reference to the warrantless vehicle search at the scene of the stop,
the court cited People v. Laursen, 8 Cal. 3d 192, 501 P.2d 1145, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425
(1972), and held that only probable cause was needed for this search. 32 Cal. App.
3d at 38, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 807. Coolidge was not mentioned. A later search of the
Pontiac at a private garage where the car had been impounded was held to be valid,
although the search was aimed at evidence linking Hill with a crime different from the
crime for which he was originally charged. Mobility was concluded to exist (id. at 42,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 810), but exigent circumstances were not discussed and Coolidge was
not mentioned. Probable cause was the key to the justification of the search. Id.
287. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).




292. Id. at 881, 512 P.2d at 1215, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
293. Id. at 883, 512 P.2d at 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
294. 7 Cal. 3d at 912, 500 P.2d at 1109, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
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valid warrantless auto search.295 Though retaining the test of reason-
ableness voiced in McKinnon, the California Supreme Court was seem-
ingly embracing the Coolidge requirement of exigent circumstances as
a prerequisite to the mobility exception. 296  The exigent circumstance
here was that there was another person in the apartment, the young
woman, who could remove or destroy the evidence.2 97 Probable cause
was predicated on the testimony of a reliable informant that, four days
prior to the search, a buyer for the bonds had not been found.291 Jus-
tice Mosk thus concluded that it was reasonable to believe that the de-
fendant still retained possession of the bonds,299 and since they were
not in the apartment or .the trash, there was a reasonable belief to as-
sume that the bonds were in the defendant's automobile. 00 How this
established justification for the subsequent warrantless search of the
vehicle is not clearly disclosed by the opinion, but the logic with respect
to the probable cause is dubious. How could the officers legally go
beyond the "places to be searched"30' 1 requirement of the fourth amend-
ment with respect to a valid search warrant? Justice Mosk responded
as follows:
The bonds might have been secreted elsewhere, of course, but we can-
not disregard the likelihood that a person who holds stolen property he
wishes to sell will attempt to conceal it in a place under his control
that is nearby and apparently secure . . . . When the officers were
unable to discover the bonds in defendant's apartment, his automobile
parked outside on the street, quite naturally became an object of strong
suspicion. Upon completing this search the officers "were entitled to
use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had
previous knowledge.
'302
With probable cause thus established, the exigent circumstances re-
quirement was satisfied by the presence of the woman in the apart-
ment. The car was mobile and a warrantless search was permissible.
The court apparently assumed that the failure of the police to list the
car in the warrant was justifiable because the police did not know that
the defendant had a car on the premises. But for policemen to dis-
cover that a California adult has a car nearby his apartment could
295. 9 Cal. 3d at 885, 512 P.2d at 1218, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
296. Id. at 883, 512 P.2d at 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312.




301. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
302. 9 Cal. 3d at 887, 512 P.2d at 1219, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
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hardly be described as an inadvertent surprise. Coolidge would seem
to require that police, when possible, secure advance approval from
a magistrate for automobile searches.
Instead, a unanimous court has in effect said that, once the officers
have a warrant to seize certain objects, they can disregard the "place
to be searched" requirement of the fourth amendment if they do not
find the sought-after material in the place that they expect it to be.
Securing of a warrant was, in this case, the equivalent of writing a
blank check to the police to find the stolen bonds wherever they were,
as long as the places to be searched were "reasonable." Justice Sulli-
van expressed this fear in his concurring opinion: "I fear this broad
statement may be interpreted by some as authorizing the wholesale
transformation of unsuccessful searches by warrant into fishing expedi-
tions in other areas not covered by warrant. '30
3
Justice Sullivan's fear is exceedingly well-founded. Since there is a
very real possibility that this case may later be used to justify the intro-
duction of evidence secured with a warrant but either not covered by the
warrant or else discovered in a place not designated as a place to be
searched in the warrant, one must speculate on the value of Dumas.
As precedent the case can be confined to a situation in which each
of the following factors is present: a search warrant is secured but
does not include the automobile; there is some showing of reasonable-
ness in inferring that the sought-after evidence is in the car; and there
is a danger that the evidence will be destroyed or removed if the car
is not immediately searched.
But if Dumas can be so confined, what of its adoption of the Cool-
idge requirement of both probable cause and exigent circumstances
prior to a warrantless search? The continued adherence to the Cool-
idge test is far from assured. Perhaps what will occur is that Cali-
fornia lower courts will continue their division in using exigent circum-
stances as a requirement for the mobility exception. The general test
will remain one of reasonableness with the exigent circumstances doc-
trine used when it will fit the judges predisposition in the case at bar.
In short, it is difficult to determine at this point whether Dumas re-
303. Id. One unique factor of the Mosk opinion is the statement that an "independ-
ent guarantee of personal privacy is set forth in Article I, Section 19, of the California
Constitution." Id. at 879, 512 P.2d at 1218, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 310. He then stated that
the expectation of privacy is defined by the test of reasonableness. Id. at 883, 512 P.2d
at 1220, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The same test was used by the court in McKinnon to de-
fine the limits of a valid search of vehicles. The court then viewed the warrantless
search as reasonable (id. at 885, 512 P.2d at 1222, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 314), and impliedly
concluded that the defendant's right to privacy was not violated.
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flects conservatism with lip service to liberal language, or whether
Dumas' conservative result is a cloak for an attempt to substantially
liberalize California's approach to the mobility exception.
VI. THE PATTERN OF COOLIDGE AND THE CLOUD OF CADY
For three years the lower courts digested Coolidge. And as we
have seen, a general pattern of application has developed, and although
this pattern is flawed by some opinions, the pattern is clear. A ve-
hicle stopped on a highway is mobile. 0 4 An auto, a trailer, or any
vehicle stopped in the proximity of an open road will be adjudged
mobile.30 5 Even a vehicle parked on private property30 6 or a con-
tainer in the possession of a common carrier807 will be mobile if it
is capable of movement and enjoys access to a route of escape. But
if the vehicle is disabled to the extent that it cannot move,308 or if
the vehicle is in some form of custodial care 0 9 which neutralizes its
capability for movement at the point of initial intrusion, then a search
warrant will be required prior to search. When confederates are still
at large or close relations will remain near the auto when the police
depart, this condition supplies -the exigent circumstance that legitimizes
the warrantless search.310 Finally, where a vehicle has been deserted,
or where a court shirks from a difficult question of mobility, the de-
fendant may be denied standing to raise an objection to the admission of
evidence seized in a warrantless auto search by the court's finding that
the vehicle was abandoned. 1
While the lower courts have thus appeared to have developed a con-
sistent approach to the mobility exception, there now exists a cloud
over this area-Cady v. Dombrowski." On September 10, 1969,
Dombrowski's disabled car was towed to his brother's farm.313 Late
that evening, the defendant rented a Ford and began to drive to his
brother's farm.314 The Ford crashed and police were summoned.31 5
When the defendant told them that he was a Chicago policeman, one
304. See notes 102-19 supra and accompanying text.
305. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
306. See notes 174-99 supra and accompanying text.
307. See notes 235-60 supra and accompanying text.
308. See notes 127-40 supra and accompanying text.
309. See notes 147-73 supra and accompanying text.
310. See notes 213-34 supra and accompanying text.
311. See notes 201-13 supra and accompanying text.
312. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
313. Id. at 433.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 435-36.
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of the officers searched the front seat and the glove compartment for
the defendant's service revolver 1 6 The revolver was not found.817
The vehicle was towed to a privately owned service station and was
left outside without police guard.3
1 8
The defendant was taken directly to the police station at around
11:30 p.m., where he was subsequently arrested for drunk driving.81
Officer Weiss returned to the Ford at 2:00 a.m. to look for the re-
volver, 20 his justification being that it was the belief of the local law
enforcement officials that Chicago police were required to carry their
weapons at all times.82 ' This effort to retrieve the revolver was stand-
ard procedure in the officer's department.8 22
Police were later directed to the brother's farm where they found
the victim of a murder. 23 The defendant's disabled Dodge was towed
to the station on September twelfth pursuant to a warrant, and a search
of the vehicle was made on the thirteenth.8 24
In upholding the warrantless search of the disabled Ford, Justice
Rehnquist's opinion adopts an auto search standard for local and state
officials different from that required of federal officials.8 25  Local and
state officials are to be given more leeway in deciding the reasonableness
of their warrantless searches because these officials have far greater
contact with vehicles and because this contact is often related to the
operation of the vehicles, and not to the investigation of crime.8 20
Justice Rehnquist reasoned as follows:
[Liocal police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and
engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as com-
munity caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, in-
vestigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to a violation of a crimi-
nal statute.327








324. Id. at 438.
325. Id. at 440-41.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 441.
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The court then made the evaluation that the difference between the
search of a house and an automobile
stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter as well as from
the fact that the extensive, and often noncriminal contact with auto-
mobiles that will bring local officials in "plain view" of evidence, fruits,
or instrumentalities of a crime or contraband.328
The opinion then attempted an unconvincing recitation of precedent
to show that the court has a tradition of distinguishing between searches
of local and federal authorities.3 29 The response of the lower courts to
this opinion, and its effect on the pattern of application of the mobility
exception that has been outlined above, is as yet unclear. The
potential for a change in the pattern is great, and it is possible (although
highly improbable) that warrantless searches of any vehicle, no matter
how incapable it is of movement, may be upheld. It is possible that
Coolidge has been made judicially comatose only three years after
birth. The extent of this possibility can be recognized by a brief re-
view of the pattern of enforcement of the mobility exception pre-
viously outlined.
It is clear that, prior to the Cady opinion, the warrantless search
of vehicles on the highway was upheld.38 0  It is equally clear that a
disabled vehicle incapable of movement was not considered mobile,
and, therefore, a warrant has been required to legitimize the search
of such a vehicle.331 But the Ford in Cady was so disabled that it was
required to be towed away, 3 2 yet a warrantless search over two hours
after the initial intrusion of law enforcement officials was upheld. 33
At the point of initial intrusion, the car was openly immobile. The
same reasoning that allowed the warrantess search of the Ford (in-
creased justification of the contact of local officials with vehicles and
the contact was consistent with standard police procedure) could justify
almost any warrantless search conducted by state or local authorities.
Any car in police custody could be the subject of a warrantless search,
328. Id. at 442.
329. Id. at 442-48. The case relied on for this distinction is United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (plain view exception to warrant requirement utilized in
warrantless search of pawnshop under federal statute). Two other cases relied upon
by Cady bear noting: Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (petitioner ar-
rested for robbery while entering his car and the police impounded the vehicle and
searched it); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 234 (1967) (upheld a warrantless search
of a glove compartment where police were required to impound the vehicle).
330. See notes 102-19 supra and accompanying text.
331. See notes 127-40supra and accompanying text.
332. 413 U.S. at 436.
333. Id. at 446.
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as long as the authorities are not federal and the custody involves a
"caretaker function." The requirement that the warrantless search be
justified at the point of the initial intrusion vanishes if this logic is ap-
plied. Likewise, the minority criterion that police must secure a search
warrant where they have advance knowledge of the need to search a
vehicle (to the extent that the opportunity to search is not fleeting)
8 4
will fail if local authorities are given such leeway in conducting warrant-
less auto searches. In summation, there is potential that the effect of
Coolidge, which is that an automobile may not be the subject of a war-
rantless search simply because it is an automobile, will be negated.
In the final analysis, it would appear that the lower courts have been
struggling to accommodate two fundamentally different conceptions of
the fourth amendment warrant requirement. One view holds that the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement can be excused only if exigent
circumstances are presented. The other view postulates a difference
of constitutional significance between the searches of houses and the
searches of cars: the former requiring a warrant, the latter not.
Neither of these views has been accepted in the line of cases extend-
ing from Carroll to Chambers to Coolidge to Cady. And since the
Supreme Court has been unable to produce a definitive response, the
lower courts have not been required to follow, but have instead been
allowed to lead. This leadership will continue until the Supreme Court
definitively resolves the permissible scope of warrantless vehicle
searches under the fourth amendment. 3 5
Shelly Jay Shafron
Charles R. Imbrecht
334. Id. at 453.
335. Subsequent to the submission of this Comment to the printer, the "mobility"
exception was once again encountered by the Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 94
S. Ct. 2464 (1974). No viewpoint was able to command a majority, thus Cady remains
the most recent Supreme Court holding on the fluid problem of automobile searches.
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